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This paper examines the various ways Internet social media networks and new media were used in the June 2009 Irani-an demonstrations following the contentious presidential 
election, the effectiveness of these media in mobilizing and inform-
ing domestic and international audiences, and the implications for 
freedom of speech, democratic norms, and human rights in Iran. 
While social media played an important role in providing news and 
images to the global audience, its domestic use was limited due to 
widespread distrust and government censorship. Although new 
technology and digital activism enabled a flow of information that 
would not traditionally exist in a closed society, the contributions 
to Iranian democracy and human rights were negligible and pos-
sibly even harmful.  
WHAT IS SOCIAL MEDIA? 
Social media is distinct from traditional media such as news-
papers, broadcasting, cable television, radio, and film. Whereas tra-
ditional mass media can be characterized as “one to many,” social 
media transforms the conversation into a “many to many” dialogue 
by facilitating social interaction via relatively new technologies, such 
as the Internet. Social media’s accessible and interactive publishing 
techniques mean that content is easily produced and information 
is widely available. Through social media networks and new me-
dia technology, individuals, formerly content consumers, become 
content producers (Benkler 2006). Social media builds on the ca-
pacities of Web 2.0 tools that facilitate user-centered design and 
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content production through web-based communities, forums, and 
applications, video and image sharing cites, wikis, and blogs (Clark 
2009). 
Building on the capacities of Web 2.0 tools, social media is 
distinct from traditional media in five important ways: it is global, 
instantaneous, highly accessible, interactive, and alterable (Benkler 
2006). Social media has a global reach and can relay news and infor-
mation almost instantaneously. Unlike mass media, social media is 
relatively inexpensive, requires little capital investment or resources 
to publish information (e.g., a printing press), and is accessible to 
an increasingly large number of the global population. Social media 
facilitates interaction between users and readers by enabling dis-
cussion, commenting, and editing. It is more participator than, and 
lacks the permanence of, older media. 
“Citizen media” is a term closely tied to social media and new 
media technologies. It is produced by private individuals who have 
no official political, social, or corporate affiliation and emphasizes 
public issues that are often absent from mainstream mass media, 
and often has a partisan bent. Citizen media empowers individuals 
to produce their own politically- and socially-motivated content. 
Andrew Shapiro argues that the emergence of new digital tech-
nologies signals “a potentially radical shift of who is in control of 
information, experience, and resources” (Croteau, 2003, 322)
New media have significant connections to and implications 
for globalization: they “radically break the connection between 
physical place and social place, making physical location much 
less significant for our social relationships” (Croteau 2003, 311). 
Global movements using these new participative technologies al-
low diverse networks of participants to collaborate, problem-solve, 
and discuss regardless of their geographic location. 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION IN IRAN
Article Twenty-Four of the Iranian constitution states that 
while “publications and the press have freedom of expression,” it is 
unlawful to express views that are “detrimental to the fundamental 
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principles of Islam or the rights of the public.” The Iranian Press 
Law of 1986 further clarifies unlawful media activity, which in-
cludes “promoting subjects which might damage the foundation of 
the Islamic Republic” and “offending the Leader of the Revolution 
and recognized religious authorities” (Open Net Initiative 2009). 
Violators face criminal prosecution, months of incarceration, tor-
ture, and even the death penalty. Ethnic-minority journalists are 
specifically targeted for harsh punishment: in 2007, two Iranian 
Kurdish journalists were given the death sentence after being de-
clared “enemies of God” and suspected of endangering national se-
curity (Freedom House 2009). Journalists and bloggers who sup-
port issues deemed “controversial” by the regime were also targeted, 
as were individuals with actual or suspected connections abroad.
Open Net Initiative, an academic project that studies Internet 
filtering, finds the Iranian press legislation to be unusual “in that 
it not only describes restricted speech but also lays out normative 
objectives for the press, who are required to ‘propagate and promote 
genuine Islamic culture and sound ethical principles.’” In May 2009 
Freedom House ranked Iran 181 out of 195 countries for media 
openness—tied with China and Rwanda, and below Syria, Sudan, 
and Somalia. The strict laws regulating the freedom to express 
political and moral ideas have led to complete state control over 
domestic newspapers, press, radio, and television. The Ministry of 
Culture must approve the domestic publication of all books, and in-
spects foreign books before their distribution. The Press Court has 
discretion to prosecute journalists, editors, and publishers based 
on its interpretation of constitutional stipulations such as “insult-
ing Islam” and “damaging the foundations of the Islamic Republic.” 
In just the first few months of 2008, the Court banned seventeen 
newspapers (Freedom House 2009). 
The government also frequently issues gag orders that limit 
coverage of specific topics and events. Before the 2009 presiden-
tial election, foreign correspondents were expelled from Iran and 
domestic journalists were strictly censored and even jailed. One 
month after the elections and protests, nearly forty journalists still 
remained in Iranian prisons (Reporters Without Borders 2009). 
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The Ahmadinejad government has made it clear that the media's 
duty is to support government policy and not to provide commen-
tary or hold officials accountable for their actions. Pervasive fear 
among journalists has created an environment of self-censorship, 
inhibiting public criticism of the president and regime (Milani 
2009). In 2007, the Iranian Journalists' Association (IRNA) re-
ported that the quality of domestic journalism suffered due to the 
government’s crackdown on independent newspapers. The govern-
ment has systematically and persistently harassed the IRNA, pres-
suring it to include pro-government journalists (Freedom House 
2009). 
The number of Internet users in Iran increased from 7.5 mil-
lion users in 2005 to twenty-three million in 2008—almost twen-
ty-five percent of the population (Open Net Initiative 2009). Orig-
inally, the government censored Internet content by forcing service 
providers to block access to a growing number of sites deemed im-
moral or politically controversial. In 2006, the authorities created 
a central filtering system to block these websites, identify domes-
tic Internet users, and keep a record of visited sites. As of Janu-
ary 2007, Iranian bloggers were also required to register with the 
government—a formidable feat given the estimated 60,000 active 
writers in the Persian blogosphere (Open Net Initiative 2009). In 
July 2008, a bill legalizing the death penalty for “the creation of we-
blogs and websites promoting corruption, prostitution and apos-
tasy” was passed by the parliament. Under this law, Iranian-Cana-
dian blogger Hussein Derakhshan was arrested in Tehran during 
a visit in November 2008 for “insulting religious figures” (Freedom 
House 2009).
The government has implemented its filtering system by 
routing all public Internet traffic through proxy servers. This al-
lows filtering software to target specific webpages and to block key-
words. The government openly admits that it blocks these websites 
in order to demonstrate its power over information. Users that at-
tempt to access a blocked site reach a page warning them that they 
are not permitted access (Open Net Initiative 2009). In 2008 and 
2009, ONI tested five Internet service provides in Iran: ITC, Gos-
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tar, Parsonline, Datak, and Sepanta. The results confirmed that the 
extent of Iran’s Internet filtering is second only to China. Iran filters 
a broad range of websites deemed offensive to the moral standards 
of Iran; for instance, those in support of women’s rights groups, 
minority rights groups, government critics, human rights organiza-
tions, and political opposition and reformist parties. 
The government has also limited Internet speeds for pub-
lic organizations and private households. Before this policy was 
implemented, fiber-optic networks had been expanding rapidly in 
Iran, more than doubling from 2005 to 2007. Mohammad Solei-
mani, the Minister of Information and Communications, publicly 
defended the limited access speeds, stating that slower speeds were 
adequate for the country’s needs and that there was no demand 
for higher speeds (Tait 2006). Iran remains the only country in 
the world to implement a limit on access speeds for private house-
holds.
The government often threatens legal and violent action 
against Internet dissenters, and increasingly it follows through on 
these threats. Although the Iranian constitution prohibits arbitrary 
arrest and detention, they are relatively routine practices. Govern-
ment officials use arbitrary detention and intimidation to encour-
age self-censorship by professional and citizen journalists. Use of 
torture against dissidents is suspected in both the unofficial de-
tention centers and the notorious Evin prison (Penketh 2009).  A 
2004 law outlawed the use of torture in interrogations, but reports 
from 2008 have shown the practice has persisted. Political prison-
ers are subjected to inhumane conditions and brutal treatment, and 
those who advocate for their rights are also subject to persecution 
(Freedom House 2009). 
At the same time as it limits public access, the government 
has also started to use the Internet to promote its own ideology and 
extend its authority. The Revolutionary Guard recently declared a 
campaign to launch ten thousand blogs written by members of the 
Basij, a volunteer Iranian paramilitary force (Bruno 2009).  The 
government has also actively spread pro-regime propaganda and 
misinformation about dissidents over the Internet. This suggests 
172 Kumar  •  Dissident Use of Social Media in Iran
a new policy directed at shaping an Internet presence favorable to 
the regime: an active, government-backed Internet campaign spe-
cifically targeting dissidents, opponents, and critics.  
JUNE 2009 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
 
An unprecedented number of voters turned out for the June 
2009 Presidential elections. The results were rejected by all three 
opposition candidates. Following the June 13 declaration of in-
cumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the winner with 63 percent 
of the vote, widespread protests took place across Iran, particularly 
in Tehran, and in major cities around the world (Worth 2009). The 
police reacted violently to the protesters, many of whom were stu-
dents, women, young activists, and supporters of the opposition 
candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi. Whether or not the election re-
sults were in fact fraudulent, the demonstrators’ use of new me-
dia reveals valuable information about how information-sharing 
technologies, social networking, and new media can support mass 
mobilization and political demonstrations in the face of state cen-
sorship and suppression.  
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared the historic voter turnout a 
“divine assessment” of Ahmadinejad and urged the nation to unite 
in support of the results, but was later forced to investigate the 
claims of fraud in the face of domestic and international pressure. 
Ahmadinejad called the election “completely free” and the outcome 
“a great victory” for Iran (BBC 2009).
The police and the paramilitary Basij suppressed both peaceful 
demonstrations and the increasingly violent riots, using a variety of 
weapons and firearms. The Iranian government has confirmed the 
deaths of thirty-six people during the protests, while supporters of 
opposition candidate Mousavi allege that there were seventy-two 
deaths in the three months following the disputed election. Iranian 
authorities further suppressed the movements by closing universi-
ties in Tehran, blocking web sites, intercepting cell phone transmis-
sions and text messaging, and banning political rallies. As of August 
2009, the Iranian government confirmed that over 4,000 people were 
173Journal of Politics & Society
temporarily detained during the protests (AFP 2009). 
 According to the Telegraph on June 14, “Iran’s regime was do-
ing its utmost to choke off the flow of news” to other areas of the 
country and the world (Blair 2009). Al-Jazeera English accused the 
government of direct censorship, stating that “some of the news-
papers have been given notices to change their editorials or their 
main headlines” (Blair 2009). The al-Arabiya offices in Tehran were 
closed on June 14 for a week, and NBC News offices in Tehran 
were raided and equipment confiscated. Peter Horrocks, director 
of BBC Worldwide, said that audiences across the Middle East 
and Europe were affected by an electronic block on the satellites 
used to broadcast the BBC Persian Television signal, which, Hor-
rocks said, “seems to be part of a pattern of behavior by the Iranian 
authorities to limit the reporting of the aftermath of the disputed 
election” (Horrocks 2009). Further corroborating this statement, 
the Iranian Ministry of Culture banned all foreign media journal-
ists from leaving their offices on June 16. While international news 
agencies could still report on the elections and protests, they were 
not allowed to directly witness the demonstrations. On June 20, the 
Ministry of Culture further banned the international media from 
issuing reports on what was occurring without explicit permission 
from the Iranian government (Reuters 2009). 
Nearly 35 percent of the Iranian population are active web-
users, the Internet and new media played a role in both the election 
process and the resulting demonstrations, acting as primary source 
of information and news for domestic and international audiences 
(Open Net Initiative 2009). Websites such as Facebook, Twitter, 
Flickr, and YouTube helped the opposition movement share the 
government’s brutal response with a global audience. 
As the Iranian government limited traditional news networks’ 
ability to report from the field, citizen journalists on the streets 
used new technology, such as cell phones, to share news, images, 
and videos of the protests via the Internet. Iranian officials have 
attempted to deflect blame onto these new media, and accuse the 
West and foreign media of backing the political opposition in order 
to undermine the Islamic government.
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CAUSAL MECHANISM OR PROTEST TOOL? 
 
 Months after the election, the causal role of social media in 
organizing protests is still disputed. The “Twitter revolution” argu-
ment holds that social media was remarkable and innovative, and 
responsible for bringing protesters together (Fisk 2009). Another 
point of view argues that the use of the Internet as rather a tool of 
citizen journalists to share news and images—that would other-
wise be suppressed both domestically and internationally. A third 
interpretation is that the use of social media to increase free speech 
actually hindered democratic movement and increased government 
repression and human rights violations. 
In order to evaluate the role of social media in response to the 
Iranian elections, the mechanisms through which it contributed to 
the protests need to be understood and its effectiveness evaluated. 
Only then will the implications for freedom of speech, democratic 
norms, and respect for human rights become apparent. 
Communication and Mobilization of Protestors
Perhaps nothing is more illustrative of Twitter’s perceived 
value as a communicative tool between Iranians as when the U.S. 
State Department asked Twitter to postpone scheduled mainte-
nance so Iranians would have access to the service during the street 
protests (Labott 2009). Texts and images calling for “death to the 
dictator” were widely distributed through email and posted on 
YouTube, and Facebook, and Twitter, creating the illusion of a col-
lective resistance of media-savvy young people at the forefront of a 
political uprising similar to 1979’s. The foreign press promoted this 
image of a “Twitter revolution” to the international audience (Sulli-
van 2009). In reality, however, extensive government censorship, in-
filtration, and blocking limited the role social media played in mo-
bilizing protestors within Iran (Schectman 2009). While protest 
organizers were sometimes able to temporarily bypass government 
censors, the larger population, wary of the new technology and of 
potential government infiltration, often distrusted mobilization at-
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tempts through the Internet. 
Sysomos, a blog, analyzed the use of Twitter in Iran during 
this period. After the election, there were 19,235 Twitter users in 
Iran, compared to the 8,654 in mid-May 2009. Sysomos deter-
mined the number of users by re-indexing over thirteen million 
Twitter accounts. They used information provided in user profiles 
as disclosed in May (for users who joined before June) to deter-
mine the location of users, in order to avoid counting those who 
changed it later to Tehran to protect and support protestors. Sy-
somos also looked at when Twitter accounts were created over the 
past 15 months. The number of Twitter users in Iran grew in 2009, 
with March and June the most active months, when 9.81 percent 
and 9.93 percent of all Twitter accounts were created, respectively 
(Sysomos 2009).  However, these numbers only show that more 
people in Iran were using Twitter during this period, and not that 
they were using it specifically for mobilization or communication 
connected to the protests. 
In fact, Iran experts and social networking activists say that 
while Iranian protesters have used social media tools, no one tech-
nology has been instrumental to organizers’ ability to mobilize. 
Most of the protest organization was done through SMS text mes-
sages and word of mouth. “Social media is not at all a prime mover of 
what is happening on the ground,” said Ethan Zuckerman, a senior 
researcher at Harvard University’s Berkman Center for Internet & 
Society. “Social media are helpful in exposing what’s happening to 
the outside world, but it’s a mistake to think that these protests [in 
Iran] are because of social media. It’s more conventional things like 
word-of-mouth and phone calls that really bring massive numbers 
of people into the streets” (Schectman 2009). 
Additionally, one of the distinctive characteristics of social 
media, the relative anonymity of tweeters and bloggers, was actual-
ly detrimental to protesters’ communication and mobilization. For 
example, a Twitter user claiming to be an Iranian student posted 
misinformation—including a report that demonstrations had been 
canceled—and listed a phone number of a supposed safe house 
for protesters that was a trap. As rumors spread that government 
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officials and secret police were using false Twitter feeds to spread 
information and trap insurgents, many citizens began to distrust 
Internet messages and to rely instead on more reliable sources 
(Kucera 2009).  
Increased Iranian censorship and website shutdowns during 
this period reinforced the public perception that the Internet was 
an unreliable source of information and communication (Open 
Net Initiative 2009). In this context, only a limited amount of com-
munication and mobilization among protestors actually occurred 
via social media. As their policies regulating speech and press have 
shown, the Iranian regime refuses to tolerate open communication 
channels within its borders and has been successful in limiting the 
flow of information through a centralized system. This is suppos-
edly intended to prevent “Western media infiltration,” but is also 
designed to minimize communication between its own citizens 
(Djavadi 2009).  
Information-Sharing
With Iran’s strict control over domestic broadcasting and the 
ban on all foreign journalists after the election, social media func-
tioned to facilitate citizen journalism within Iran and throughout 
the world via stories, photos, and videos.  
Domestically, this mechanism was muted because of the 
widespread distrust of Internet sources and the strict government 
censorship and filtering software discussed above.  Information on-
line was intensely partisan and sometimes factually untrue, leaving 
Iranians to rely more on state-controlled media or word-of-mouth 
for details about the protests. For example, two false rumors that 
three million protestors were on the streets and that Mousavi was 
under house arrest spread quickly through Twitter, Facebook, and 
blogs without undergoing the fact- and source-checking that would 
have been by professional journalists (Kucera 2009).  
Social media played its most prominent role in relaying in-
formation, though not always accurately, to a global audience. The 
Iranian government worked “on many fronts to shield the outside 
177Journal of Politics & Society
world’s view of the unrest, banning coverage of the demonstrations, 
arresting journalists, threatening bloggers, and trying to block Web 
sites like Facebook and Twitter.” However, social media allowed 
news, images, and video to spread throughout the world (Heacock 
2009).
As the Iranian government restricted professional journalists’ 
access to events, the protesters were able to use Twitter’s innova-
tive communication system to direct the public and journalists to 
video, photographs, and written material related to the protests, 
even when the Twitter site itself was blocked domestically (Cohen 
2009). User-generated content and reporting from Iranians on the 
ground allowed foreign news networks and bloggers to share infor-
mation worldwide, although in many instances confirmation of the 
facts (when such was possible) was delayed. “We’ve been struck by 
the amount of video and eyewitness testimony…[Sometimes] up 
to five videos a minute from amateur sources,” confirmed Jon Wil-
liams, BBC world news editor. “The days when regimes can control 
the flow of information are over” (BBC 2009).
U.S. officials said the Internet, specifically social networking 
sites like Twitter and Facebook, provided the United States with 
critical information in the face of an Iranian ban on Western jour-
nalists covering political rallies. Because the United States has no 
official relations with Iran and does not have an embassy in the 
country, it relied on information from media reports and the State 
Department’s Iran Watch Offices located in embassies around the 
world. Although U.S. officials would not say whether they were 
communicating with Iranians directly, one noted that the United 
States learned that individuals had been identified and detained 
based on Twitter posts. “It is a very good example of where technol-
ogy is helping,” the official said (Labott 2009). 
The situation in Iran is an example of the State Department’s 
efforts to increase its use of technology in diplomacy, including so-
cial networking sites and Web video, to reach large numbers of peo-
ple who would otherwise be difficult to reach (Pleming 2009). The 
Internet and the new media outlets gave international audiences an 
unprecedented look into the workings of both state violence and 
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massive unrest in Iran that could not be limited by traditional state 
forces of suppression.
Public Forum
Social media also contributed to the protests by creating an 
online public forum through which protestors, citizens, and observ-
ers could discuss, share, collaborate, and air grievances and ideas 
that the government would traditionally repress. Iranians were 
also able to instantaneously and continuously communicate with 
Iranians living outside Iran as well as with foreign observers and 
supporters—social media facilitated relationships between West-
erners and Iranians that are blocked on the formal international 
level. A physical manifestation of this was the spread of the elec-
tion protests to cities around the world through the use of similar 
slogans and symbols (e.g., “Sea of Green” in reference to Mousavi’s 
supporters), and the letters of support issued by Iranians living in 
the West (Dabashi 2009). 
A study by Mike Edwards, a social network researcher at The 
New School for Design, examined 79,000 tweets related to the 
Iran protests and found that one-third were repostings of other 
tweets (one-twentieth of all posts on Twitter, on average, are re-
posts) (Scola 2009). This suggests that many Twitter users in Iran 
did not use the network to communicate new information, but to 
express symbolic solidarity and unity in the form of “retweets.” 
Individual photos and images, and stories of fraud, repres-
sion, and brutality, helped harness the emotional aspect of the pro-
test and allowed citizens a public space to discuss topics and alter-
native political ideas prohibited under Iranian law. State power no 
longer has a stranglehold on information and association, at least 
not in the way it did before the emergence of new media and its cre-
ation of cyber-areas for political discussion (Djavadi 2009). These 
new technologies were used to bypass government censorship and 
geographical distance, and they created forums in which citizens 
and international observers could interact by sharing images, news, 
and ideas. Global opposition and transactional advocacy networks 
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emerged and created wider spheres of exchange, dialogue, and re-
sistance. For example, protesters around the world set up proxy 
servers, making their own computers available to Iranians (Gross, 
2009). Mobile phone footage of the shooting of Neda Soltani, a 
young Iranian woman killed during a protest, was posted on You-
Tube and other websites almost instantaneously and became a de-
fining image of the Iranian crisis.
The Iranian uprising utilized the power of violent images dis-
seminated throughout cyberspace. The distribution of images was 
a key strategy that attracted worldwide media coverage. The pro-
tests’ success in that area showed that new media could create alter-
native public spheres in the face of government oppression. Within 
these virtual public spaces political activists acted as a unified force 
against the regime and promoted positive intervention and change 
(Lucas 2009).  Unlike the more temporary mobilization and infor-
mation-sharing uses of other social media, these public spaces and 
the strengthening of international networks are lasting results of 
the protests that have the ability to continue and grow with future 
instances of collective discontent.  
Government Backlash 
ONI confirmed the expansion of targeted website blocking 
during the protests, which made access to reporting of events as 
well as political organizing far more difficult for Iranians. You-
Tube, Twitter, Facebook, the English and Persian versions of BBC, 
and websites of the major opposition candidates were all blocked. 
The government also blocked the blog host, blogfa.com, prevent-
ing many Iranian bloggers from updating their blogs. Although it 
stopped short of shutting down the Internet altogether, the gov-
ernment limited bandwidth and access speeds across the country. 
However, after years of Internet filtering, Iranian hackers and on-
line activists had developed tools to circumvent government restric-
tions—an unintended consequence of government policies.  
The government response to traditional and new media jour-
nalism was similar to their violent response to street protestors, 
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and continued through 2009. “At least a hundred journalists and 
cyber-dissidents have been arrested since the June 12th elections, 
and twenty-three of them are still being held” (Reporters Without 
Borders 2009). The Committee for the Protection of Journalists 
called Iran the “world’s leading jailer of journalists.” The govern-
ment uses fear of violent action and criminal prosecution to intimi-
date journalists and further limit freedom of speech, and reports 
from Tehran indicated a government strategy of targeting citizen 
journalists during the protests (Committee to Protect Journalists 
2009).
Among these three categories—information-sharing, creat-
ing a public space, and mobilizing protesters—social media has 
primarily been successful as a tool to share news and images with 
a global audience to gain the attention of the international media 
networks, and to create an open space for discussion and symbolic 
solidarity. It was not, however, a causal or practical mechanism that 
fueled or enabled the weeks-long protest. Government suppres-
sion, infiltration, and censorship limited the ability of protestors 
to use social media to mobilize, communicate, or share information 
with domestic audiences. 
EXPANDING FREEDOM OF SPEECH
There are many different ways to understand a “free” media 
environment: constitutional provisions protecting press freedom 
and freedom of information; enforcement of the provisions; an 
absence of laws restricting reporting; freedom of media outlets to 
determine content; free access to sources; a lack of official censor-
ship and journalist self-censorship; freedom of media outlets from 
intimidation and violence; freedom from economic control by the 
government; freedom from economic manipulations and bribery; 
and a transparency of ownership which allows “consumers to judge 
the impartiality of the news” (Whitten-Woodring 2009, 598). Es-
pecially in the context of reporting the elections and protests, the 
traditional and new forms of media in Iran arguably fail to meet 
almost every one of these requirements.  The Iranian regime has 
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systematically and purposefully limited, if not eliminated, the 
mainstream media’s ability to act as a “watchdog” of government by 
denying it these freedoms.  
The role social media played in creating a public space for 
discussion and solidarity, as well as distributing Iranian news and 
images internationally, calls into question some of the more strin-
gent requirements for a media to be classified as “free.” A narrower 
definition of media freedom is the “ability to perform a watchdog 
role, monitoring and criticizing government behavior, because 
when the media performs this function it is able to act as a forum 
for political debate regardless of other limitations on its freedom” 
(Whitten-Woodring 2009, 601). Using this narrower definition of 
the media, new and social media forms were able to expand free-
dom of expression to the point where they were able to fulfill the 
“watchdog” role traditionally held by traditional media outlets in 
countries without pervasive government control and censorship of 
the press.  Although the Iranian regime limited the impact of social 
media, especially with regards to domestic mobilization, communi-
cation, and information-sharing through censorship, blocking, and 
infiltration, it stopped short of shutting down the internet entirely, 
allowing digital “holes” to open up in an otherwise closed society.
New media provided a public space for debate and dissemi-
nated news and images about the protests, which questioned the 
legitimacy that the regime hoped to claim in holding elections. 
Information regarding police brutality, beatings, and arrests was 
leaked to the world through vivid photos, stories, and videos, de-
spite government attempts to repress its release through stringent 
press policies. Although new media cannot fill the role of a tradi-
tional free press and constitutional protection of free speech, the 
mechanisms of information sharing and creating a public space al-
low it to partially take on the “watchdog” role of exposing govern-
ment abuses and the manipulation of the elections. 
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EFFECT ON DEMOCRATIC NORMS AND RESPECT FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
Scholars and proponents of free speech have argued that free-
dom of speech is more important to democracy than the right to 
vote, relying on the belief that “if citizens have the right to com-
plain, to petition, to organize, to protest, to demonstrate, to strike, 
to threaten to emigrate, to publish,” government will be more re-
sponsible and more responsive to its citizens (Mueller 1992, 984). 
According to this argument, the use of new and social media in ex-
panding freedom of speech in Iran should have limited the Iranian 
regime’s human rights abuses.
However, during the months since Ahmadinejad’s election, 
Iran’s human rights situation has worsened, with mass arrests and 
detentions as well as brutal repression of demonstrations. Accord-
ing to Tehran’s prosecutor-general, Qorban-Ali Dorri Najafabadi, 
as of August 2009 more than 4,000 had been arrested in the capital 
alone. More than 240 prominent citizens were arrested by “uniden-
tified agents and taken to undisclosed locations…[They are] held 
in incommunicado detention and have no access to legal counsel” 
(International Campaign for Human Rights 2009). These perva-
sive actions are explicit violations of the basic rights guaranteed by 
Iran’s legal codes and by the international treaties it has signed. 
This repressive and abusive government response supports 
Jenifer Whitten-Woodring’s conception of the relationship be-
tween free expression and democracy: she argues that free press 
is a characteristic of democratic societies, and that in authoritar-
ian states which lack democratic accountability, expansion of free 
speech actually begins a cycle of protest and government repression. 
Unlike in developed democracies, free speech under authoritarian 
regimes has a negative effect on the development of democratic 
norms and respect for human rights. In the case of Iran, which is by 
no classification a real electoral democracy, expansion of freedom of 
speech has brought with it increased arbitrary arrest and detention 
of journalists and dissidents, and distortion of the rule of law for 
protestors who have been incarcerated and criminally prosecuted. 
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Both on the streets and in the prisons, government repression has 
decreased respect for a fundamental human right to personal integ-
rity. The right to the integrity of one’s own person, defined as the 
“right to life and the inviolability of the human person…[protection 
from] prolonged and arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killing, tor-
ture, genocide, and other severe violations of bodily integrity,” is 
considered indispensable to human dignity (Cingranelli 1999). 
The government response towards the protestors and dissidents 
has been swift and brutal, using systematic state violence to main-
tain political power and dissuade further uprisings. 
A more complex question concerning social media’s role is 
whether the international dissemination of news, images, and vid-
eos of government human rights violations has helped mitigate the 
violent aftermath of the protests—limiting what could have been a 
more severe crackdown on political agitators and protestors with-
out the worldwide attention created by new media. Google chief 
executive Eric Schmidt said he hoped that the many clips of vio-
lent protest scenes posted on YouTube has helped to “moderate an 
over-reaction by the government.”  Schmidt refers to the theorized 
“YouTube effect” whereby “video clips, often produced by individu-
als acting on their own, are rapidly disseminated throughout the 
world thanks to video sharing websites…[Every] month, YouTube 
receives 20 million visitors who watch 100 million videos each day” 
(Naim 2007, 102)
In the “double-echo chamber”—where web-content which is 
re-aired by TV networks and is made permanent through web dis-
tribution by bloggers—these videos are expected to bring greater 
transparency and accountability to governments in traditionally 
closed and undemocratic societies.  Building on the CNN effect 
of the 1990s, scholars hypothesize that wide international dis-
semination of these videos will help to determine foreign policy 
and humanitarian interventions by enhancing public knowledge of 
government atrocities.  They expect the dissemination effect to be 
even greater than that of mainstream news networks: “Internation-
al news operations may have thousands of professional journalists, 
but they will never be as omnipresent as millions of people carrying 
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phones that record video” (Naim 2007, 103).
Iranian government leaders, while outwardly blaming the for-
eign media and Western government officials for fueling the pro-
tests and meddling in their affairs, did feel the need to justify the 
election and protests to the world. The current regime claims its 
legitimate rule is derived from two forces: divine favor and popu-
lar support stemming from the revolutionary heritage of 1979.  In 
this sense, maintaining at least a façade of democratic participation 
through popular elections is important to the its political power.  In 
an attempt to re-establish legitimacy after the protests, Khamenei 
publicly announced an investigation regarding the accusations of 
voter fraud a few weeks after the election, and eventually declared 
Ahmadinejad the winner (BBC 2009).  The digital movement has 
eroded the legitimacy created through the Iranian electoral process 
and limited what may have been even greater human rights viola-
tions against the protestors. Despite this, the government is still 
not being held accountable for violating the physical integrity of its 
citizens. Foreign governments and international organizations are 
widely abstaining from commenting on or involving themselves in 
Iran’s internal affairs. U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon sent a 
traditional congratulatory message to Ahmadinejad after his inau-
guration in August of 2009, despite a hunger strike in front of the 
United Nations’ New York headquarters led by dissident journalist 
Akbar Gangi calling for the release of political prisoners arrested in 
the election aftermath (Penketh 2009).
PUTTING IT IN CONTEXT: A GREEN REVOLUTION?
In order to apply the lesson were s learned through the Ira-
nian protests about the role new and social media can play in dem-
onstrations against repressive regimes and within closed societies, 
we must evaluate whether or not the movement can actually be 
categorized as a “revolution.” Jack Goldstone defines a revolution 
as “an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifica-
tions for political authority in society, accompanied by formal or 
informal mass mobilization and non-institutionalized actions that 
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undermine authorities” (Goldstone 2001). International audiences 
and mass media outlets have characterized the protests surround-
ing the Iranian presidential election, and the demonstrations that 
have continued throughout the summer and fall of 2009, as sig-
nifying a fundamental, revolutionary shift in the Iranian political 
structure that has not been witnessed since the Islamic Revolu-
tion of 1979 (Sullivan 2009).  While it is true that the protests 
have harnessed much of the discontent and unrest within Iran, 
especially among younger activists and women who supported op-
ponent candidate Mousavi, there has not been a widespread effort 
to supplant the regime that was put into power in the late 1970s 
by mass demonstrations and student movements.   The protestors 
were mobilized by what they believed were the fraudulent results 
of an election that was undemocratic to begin with—the Islamic 
leaders vetted the potential candidates and determined who was 
allowed to run for the office in the first place.  It has been suggested 
that even if Mousavi had been elected, no fundamental changes 
would have occured in Iranian society or political sphere (Schect-
man 2009). Whether or not the continuing protests and growing 
civil resistance movement develop into a revolution with the larger 
goal of changing the structure of Iranian government cannot yet be 
determined.   Since the June 2009 elections, protestors have used 
several national holidays as opportunities to express their continu-
ing discontent with the regime, and media coverage has served to 
re-draw the world’s attention to the situation.  
The role social media played in Iran’s “summer of discontent” 
signifies both the possibilities and limitations of digital resistance 
within traditionally closed societies.  A true revolution may develop, 
similar to the “color revolutions” earlier this decade that emerged 
from contested elections in the former Soviet Union and Balkan 
states.  However, for this to happen, the spirit of the protests and 
desire for fundamental political change would have to spread be-
yond Tehran’s activists to Iranian society as a whole, including the 
lower classes, rural inhabitants, and the older population. Until 
this occurs, the regime may still claim legitimacy through popular 
support and blame Western influences and media for the uprisings 
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against the government.  The Internet and social media are lim-
ited in their ability to engage and mobilize these other sectors of 
society who are not technology-savvy enough to surpass pervasive 
government filtering and censorship, who distrust the information 
provided by new media forms, or who may not have access to the 
technology or tools necessary (Fairbanks 2009).  The barriers of 
digitalized resistance help explain why participation in the dem-
onstrations that have continued throughout the fall has remained 
limited to the original June protestors—young activists in Tehran. 
The continuing protests have been met with government repres-
sion both on the streets and online, and the regime has shown its 
ability to adapt its censorship techniques to new technological de-
velopments.  Reporters Without Borders found that the govern-
ment further limited access speed and increased webpage blocking 
days before the anticipated protests on November 4 and December 
7 to prevent online organizing and mobilization. 
Examination of the use of new media and online social net-
working has shown a remarkable ability, in the context of resistance 
movements, of protesters to harness the new technology available 
to provide almost instantaneous information and images to a global 
audience, as well as to create a global cyber-civic society in which 
individuals and organizations may discuss and collaborate around 
the movements (Dabashi 2009).  The worldwide attention, net-
works of solidarity, and media coverage of the Iranian demonstra-
tions have prompted the street protests to continue, despite lim-
ited gains and costly violent suppression and abuse.  Without these 
tools, the dissidents would be protesting in a traditional closed 
society with no ability to communicate or share information with 
audiences abroad.  
Using social media tools, Iranian protesters were able to greatly 
expand their freedom of speech and information-sharing abilities, 
but often at the cost of increased human rights abuses, arbitrary 
arrest, and torture.  Beginning in August 2009, the government 
began to legally prosecute prominent protestors, journalists, and 
dissidents.  The five death sentences handed down thus far serve 
as a constant reminder to potential protestors that the regime still 
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wields substantial power, and accusations of rape, torture, murder, 
and forced confessions re-emphasize the cruel acts through which 
the regime’s authority is be manifested. However, the vast and 
continuing international media coverage of the so-called “Twitter 
Revolution” as well as the regime’s response has also shown that the 
government will never be able to fully silence the Iranian electorate 
as long as digital protestors continue to tweet, upload pictures and 
videos, and blog for a global audience.  Within this framework, the 
world—including foreign governments and international organiza-
tions—will continue watching Twitter feeds and You Tube videos 
as events in Iran unfold. 
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